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In many industries it is quite common to observe firms delegating
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1 Introduction
In many industries we observe firms which delegate the production of an essential
input to an independent venture carried out in cooperation with one (or more)
firm(s) competing in the downstream market for the final good. Many examples
may be found in most sectors.
In the automotive, for instance, Ford and PSA produce and design diesel
engines in a specific joint venture; Ford and Fiat produce in a jointly owned
plant the KA and the 500 on the basis of many common inputs.
In the electronic industry Sony jointly produces with rival Sharp newest
liquid crystal displays.
In the media production, newspapers get rough news from press agencies
they jointly own, like Associated Press in U.S.A. and ANSA in Italy.
In the chemicals it is quite common for giant companies to jointly own plants
where ethylene and other basic components for plastics are manufactured, such
as in the recent agreement between Dow and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
(Hewitt, 2008). Many other industries display cases of joint ventures in up-
stream sections of production. A great portion of them are known and visible
even to the accidental observer.
Most of these joint ventures devoted to the manufacturing of an essential
input are autonomous companies owned and governed on an equal foot by del-
egates of firms operating and competing among each other in the Downstream
(D) section of the vertical chain of production.
We may term this arrangement as Input Production Joint Venture (IPJV).
It may be regarded as an intermediate organizational setting lying between
two extremes: Vertical Integration (VI), where the essential input is entirely
manufactured in-house and Vertical Separation (VS), where the intermediate
good is bought from external and independent firms operating in the Upstream
(U) section of the vertical chain of production. Industrial Organization (IO)
has so far considered VS, VI1 and partial VS,2 while the case of IPJV is studied
only in the management literature.3
The closest case so far analyzed in IO is the Research Joint Venture (RJV)
with a large and consolidated literature.4 A RJV is a pre-production choice,
based on the maximization of firms’ joint profits. A IPJV requires an inde-
pendent input producer owned on an equal stake by D firms. The profit of
the venture accrues ultimately to the D firms which own the IPJV which is a
particular case of Equity Joint Venture, as defined by Hewitt (2008)5 . From
1For a recent survey of most theoretical and empirical issues on vertical integration, see
Lafontaine and Slade (2007).
2The analysis of partial outsourcing can be found in Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007), Shy
and Stenbacka (2005), Moretto and Rossini (2008).
3See for example Hewitt (2008) and the rich management literature surveyed on the subject.
4The seminal paper on R&D cooperation is d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) which was
then extended by, e.g, Kamien et al. (1992), and generalized by Amir et al. (2003) and
Lambertini and Rossini (2009).
5“An equity joint venture .....is a joint venture or alliance which has the following character-
istics, namely where (i) each party has an ownership interest in a jointly owned business, (ii)
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the market structure viewpoint this arrangement is a kind of partial collusion.
However, it does not seem to have given rise to much antitrust complain and
suit so far.
Here, we would like to start to fill the gap in IO and analyze IPJV. Our aim
is to examine feasibility, private and/or social desirability of IPJV considering
also static uncertainty. A major problem we shall investigate is the stability of
this arrangement or, in other words, the incentives that firms have to disengage
or to join the plot of firms doing IPJV.
As said above the closest case to IPJV is provided by Research Joint Ven-
tures (RJV). As literature emphasizes RJV is able to raise industry profits and,
in most cases, also social welfare.6 This result has produced a favorable stance
by the US Department of Justice and many other antitrust authorities. “RJVs
often provide procompetitive benefits, such as sharing the substantial economic
risks involved in R&D, increasing economies of scale in R&D beyond what indi-
vidual firms could realize....The antitrust enforcement agencies also view most
RJVs as procompetitive and typically analyze them under the rule of reason
because of their potential to enable participants to develop more quickly or ef-
ficiently new or improved goods, services, or production processes. Under the
Competitors Collaboration Guidelines, the agencies will not ordinarily challenge
a RJV when there are three or more other independently controlled firms with
comparable research capabilities and incentives”.7 The case we are going to
analyze of IPJV could be classified, according to the received taxonomy, as a
subset of Production Joint Venture. Towards these arrangements the stance of
market authorities has been mostly benign due to their supposed procompetitive
effect and to the benefit consumers get: “Courts typically have analyzed true
production joint ventures under the rule of reason and generally have upheld
them”.8 The favorable stance of antitrust authorities should be also justified on
the basis of the instability of IPJV. As reported in the management literature,
almost one half of joint ventures end in a divorce (Hewitt, 2008, p.12).
In the ensuing pages we develop an oligopoly model with horizontally dif-
ferentiated goods and analyze IPJV comparing it with VI. We replicate some
canonical results on social superiority of VI, with linear pricing. However, we
show that IPJV (partial or complete, according to whether only some or all firms
in the market participate in the joint venture) is privately preferred to VI for
high enough levels of competition in the D product market. These novel results
obtain in the most unfavorable scenarios for IPJV, i.e., with zero fixed costs.
A fortiori, they hold in the case of positive fixed costs, since IPJV prevents
the jointly owned business has a distinct management structure in which each party directly
participates and (iii) the parties share the profits (or losses) of the jointly owned business”.
(Hewitt, 2008, p. 96).
6The pionereeing contribution comes from Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) who found
that joint process research and development is welfare maximizing when firms compete à la
Cournot in the product market and in most cases of Bertand competition. The existence of
spillovers due to RJV are crucial to the result. For the most recent contributions on the topic,
which do not subvert the initial wisdom, see...
7Jacobson (2007) p. 447.
8 Ibidem, p. 450.
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wasteful replication of fixed costs. The private profitability of IPJV goes up as
we move to more competitive market structures, i.e., as the number of firms
increases, as products become closer substitutes or as we go from Cournot to
Bertrand competition. The advantage of IPJV, when competition gets tougher,
is due to the fact that D firms are able to reap profits in U (they jointly own)
so as to compensate for the reduced returns in D. In this sense D firms are not
afraid of competition in D. On the contrary, they may love it since they are
sheltered by their profit “reserve” in U. As for the disengagement issue, we find
that, when firms doing IPJV compete with vertically integrated rivals and prod-
uct market substitutability is low, there may be an incentive to leave the IPJV.
However, in some cases, incumbent vertically integrated firms may compensate
IPJV members to stay in and make IPJV stable.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section (2) we compare VI with
IPJV in a duopoly model, and we investigate the role of the degree of prod-
uct differentiation, fixed cost and the nature of competition in the D product
market in determining the private and social desirability of IPJV. In Section
(3), we extend our analysis to oligopoly and we consider partial IPJV, i.e., the
case in which only some of the firms in the market participate in the IPJV
while competing with other VI firms. In Section (4) we address the disengage-
ment question widely analyzed in the managerial literature on Joint Ventures
(Hewitt, 2008).Private incentives to disengage from the IPJV may in some cir-
cumstances dominate and make a IPJV unsustainable. Finally, in Section (5)
we analyze the relative preference of the different vertical arrangements under
static uncertainty. Conclusions are given in Section (6).
2 A simple duopoly model
We begin with a simple model where there are two firms competing in the
downstream (D) market. Each firm i produces a differentiated product, qi sold
at price pi. The demand system is given by linear inverse demand schedules
pi = a − qi − bqj in the region of quantities where prices are positive. The
parameter a > 0 represents the market size; b ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of
substitutability between the two final products (if b = 1, products are perfect
substitutes; if b = 0, products are specialized, i.e., perfectly differentiated). To
manufacture a final good, each firm needs an essential input which is produced
either by the firm itself (VI) or by an independent U enterprise owned in equal
stakes by the two D firms (Input Production Joint Venture - IPJV). More pre-
cisely, for the input production the D firms set up an Equity Joint Venture
(Hewitt, 2008) whose profits accrue ultimately to the D firms.
As it is customary in the literature on vertical relationships we assume that
one unit of input is embodied in each unit of output (perfect vertical comple-
mentarity). Input production requires a fixed cost equal to f ≥ 0. Assume
that the marginal production cost of the input is constant and equal to z < a;
without loss of generality we set z = 0. Given the inverse demand system for
the final goods Cournot competition leads to different equilibria according to
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the vertical arrangements and the resulting U market structure. We examine
two distinct cases in turn.
The first is based on VI: there are two (symmetric) firms each comprising a
U and a D activity. Their profits are:
π1 = q1p1 − f
π2 = q2p2 − f
Quantity competition yields the customary symmetric equilibrium with the fol-
lowing price and industry profits (C stands for Cournot):9
pCV I =
a
(b+ 2)
ΠCV I = 2
(
a
2 + b
)2
− 2f > 0
⇐⇒ f/a2 < 1
(2 + b)2
≡ sV I (b) . (1)
The second case is based on IPJV. The D firms jointly own on an equal
stake the independent U producer of the essential input, while competing among
themselves in the D section. Namely, both D firms get the input at the linear
price g set at the input stage by the (monopolistic) U producer in order to
maximize its profit, πU = g (q1 + q2). The vertical interaction between U and
D is modelled as a two stage-game solved backwards, as it is customary in
literature adopting linear pricing.10 The input price is set at the monopoly
level, gM = a/2 and the IPJV symmetric equilibrium magnitudes are (labeled
with J):
qCJ =
a
2 (b+ 2)
,
πCJ =
a2
4 (b+ 2)2
,
πCU =
a2
2 (b+ 2)
− f,
pCJ =
a (3 + b)
2 (b+ 2)
.
9Equilibrium variables are:
q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
a
2 + b
π∗
1
= π∗
2
=
(
a
2 + b
)
2
− f
p∗
1
= p∗
2
= p∗
V I
=
a
(b+ 2)
.
10Recent examples may be found in Sappington (2005) and Arya et al. (2008).
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Industry profits are:
ΠCJ =
(b+ 3) a2
2 (b+ 2)2
− f > 0
⇐⇒ f/a2 < (b+ 3)
2 (b+ 2)2
≡ sJ (b) . (2)
Comparing the equilibrium values of the two vertical arrangements we may
write the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Private and social relative efficiency of IPJV vs. VI.
a) Assume that input production does not require any fixed cost, i.e. f = 0.
In a duopoly market, a producer of a final good is indifferent between verti-
cally integrating (VI) and participating to a IPJV as long as the final goods are
homogeneous. In contrast, when the final goods are horizontally differentiated,
downstream firms benefit if they switch to vertical integration. As for consumers,
they always prefer vertical integration, which turns out to be Pareto superior.
b) Assume that the fixed cost in U is f > 0 and let s = f/a2 be a relative
measure of fixed cost vis à vis market size. It appears that IPJV is privately
preferred for large levels of s (high relative fixed cost) and for increasing levels
of b (decreasing differentiation). Consumers’ preferences do not change with
respect to point a). Social welfare turns out to be always superior with VI.
Proof. a) Suppose first that f = 0. Profits’ comparison is:
ΠCJ −ΠCV I = (b− 1)
a2
2 (b+ 2)2
≤ 0.
As for the consumer surplus, it is higher under VI where the equilibrium price
is lower, i.e., p∗J − p∗V I = a(b+1)2(b+2) > 0. Therefore, VI is privately and socially
preferred.
b) Suppose now f > 0, the previous comparison becomes:
ΠCJ −ΠCV I =
f
(
8b+ 2b2 + 8
)− a2 (1− b)
2 (b+ 2)
2 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ f
a2
≥ (1− b)
2 (b+ 2)
2 ≡ s (b) (3)
where s ≡ f/a2 is a relative measure of fixed cost with respect to market size.
As for social welfare (SW) we have to compare the sums of consumer surplus and
industry profits in the two cases (VI and IPJV). Straightforward calculations
lead to the definition of the following threshold:
s˜ (b) =
(5 + b)
4 (b+ 2)2
(4)
below which the SW of VI is larger than the SW of IPJV. Therefore, in the
feasible set of parameters, VI is always socially preferred.
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For the sake of simplicity, we plot (1), (2), (3) and (4) in the plane (b, s) in
Figure 1 below. The upper solid line defines sJ (b) above which neither vertical
arrangement is feasible. The intermediate solid line defines sV I (b) below which
VI is feasible. The lower solid line defines s (b) above which IPJV is privately
preferred to VI, while below this line VI is preferred. The dashed line represents
the social welfare frontier, s˜ (b) below which VI is socially preferred to IPJV.
10.750.50.250
0.5
0.375
0.25
0.125
0
b
s
FIGURE 1 Threshold lines for private and social ranking of JIPV vs VI.
Discussion. Whenever the fixed cost of producing the essential input is
sufficiently high, IPJV is privately more efficient. This becomes more likely as
differentiation decreases. While the first effect is fairly obvious, the second is
less clear-cut and points to the influence of differentiation on D competition.
As b → 1 industry profits “migrate” to U since the D section becomes more
competitive driving down profits. The opposite occurs for VI which suffers from
a tougher competition in D and does not benefit from any U profit buffer since
it internally transfers the input at the marginal cost. In our duopoly scheme
IPJV is never socially efficient since it introduces a sort of U collusion coupled
to double marginalization. This negative effect has to be contrasted with the
wasteful duplication of fixed costs associated to VI. The large areas of private
superiority of IPJV, even in the duopoly case, accounts for the observed diffusion
of Equity Joint Ventures along the vertical chain of production.
We conclude the duopoly case by investigating the profitability of the two
vertical arrangements when firms compete à la Bertrand and we compare the
results with Cournot.
Consider the same linear inverse demand system, pi = a − qi − bqj . The
demand schedule, for b 
= 1, is then given by qi = α− βpi + δpj , with
α =
a
1 + b
, β =
1
(1− b) (1 + b) , δ =
b
(1− b) (1 + b) .
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Under VI, price competition yields the following symmetric equilibrium (B
stands for Bertrand):
pBV I =
(a− ab)
(2− b)
πBV I =
a2 (1− b)
(b− 2)2 (b+ 1) − f
qBV I =
a
(2− b) (b+ 1)
So that aggregate profits are ΠBV I = 2
a2(1−b)
(b−2)2(b+1) − 2f .11 Under IPJV, the
equilibrium magnitudes are:
pBJ =
a (3− 2b)
2 (2− b)
πBJ =
a2 (1− b)
4 (b− 2)2 (b+ 1)
πBU =
a2
2 (2− b) (b+ 1) − f
qBJ =
a
2 (2− b) (b+ 1)
So that aggregate profits are ΠBJ =
(3−2b)a2
2(b−2)2(b+1) − f .
Comparing the equilibrium values of the two vertical arrangements in the
two distinct market structures, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 2 Bertrand duopoly and comparisons
a) With Bertrand competition in the D market, if f = 0 IPJV is privately
preferred to VI as long as b ∈ [12 , 1).
b) IPJV under Bertrand competition yields larger D quantities, lower D
prices, higher U profits and lower D profits than under Cournot competition,
i.e., qBJ > q
C
J , p
B
J < p
C
J , π
B
U > π
C
U and π
B
J < π
C
J ; industry profits and consumer
surplus are higher under Bertrand.
Proof. a) Comparing the joint profits under the two scenarios we find that:
ΠBJ −ΠB =
(2b− 1) a2
2 (b− 2)2 (b+ 1) + f.
Assume f = 0, ΠBJ −ΠB > 0 ⇐⇒ b > 1/2.
11As one can expect (Sing and Vives, 1984), the same scenario under quantity competition
leads to higher profits, i.e. ΠC
V I
> ΠB
V I
.
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b) The IPJV scenario under price and quantity competition yields the fol-
lowing equilibrium comparisons:
qBJ − qCJ =
b2a
2 (b+ 1) (b+ 2) (2− b) > 0,
pBJ − pCJ =
−b2a
2 (b+ 2) (2− b) < 0,
πBU − πCU =
b2a2
2 (b+ 1) (b+ 2) (2− b) > 0,
πBJ − πCJ =
−b3a2
2 (b+ 2)2 (b− 2)2 (b+ 1)
< 0, and
ΠBJ −ΠCJ = (
4−2b−b2)a2b2
2(b+2)2(b−2)2(b+1) > 0.
Discussion. The profitability of IPJV vs VI increases when we go from a
Cournot to a Bertrand market structure regardless of the fixed cost. In fact,
this form of joint venture is strictly preferred over VI when goods are sufficiently
substitutable even in the absence of fixed costs. The presence of positive fixed
costs clearly reinforces the relative profitability of IPJV. As for the comparison
of IPJV under the two natures of competition, with Bertand the D externality
affects the distribution of profits along the vertical chain making the U section
more profitable and the D section less profitable vis à vis Cournot. Nonetheless
Bertrand competition is able to make for larger industry profits. This outcome
is due to the larger quantity produced that allows for higher U profits which
overcompensate for the squeeze in D. As a result, in line with Singh and Vives
(1984), Bertrand competition is socially preferred to Cournot competition.12
3 Oligopoly
Here we extend and generalize the investigation conducted in the above section.
We consider an oligopoly where n ≥ 3 firms operate. The extension comes
from the analysis of mixed cases which were not contemplated in the duopoly
framework, and from the stance of the US Department of Justice quoted in the
introduction (Jacobson, 2007; p. 447). To this aim we go through the case
of a mixed market arrangement where vertically integrated (VI) firms compete
with non integrated firms which buy the essential input from an independent
producer serving all non integrated companies. As in the previous section, the
independent U producer, responsible for IPJV, is owned by non integrated firms
which are active in D.
Consider the linear inverse demand schedule pi = a− qi − b
∑
j =i qj . Again,
without loss of generality, we set the marginal cost of production of the essential
input z = 0.
12This is in contrast with Arya,et al. (2008) who maintain that the selling of input by a VI
firm to D competitors may reverse the standard social ranking of Cournot vs Bertrand.
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Now, we are able to extend the analysis to three distinct scenarios that we
study in turn. In the first, all firms are VI, in the second, partial IPJV, some
firms are VI and others participate in the IPJV, while in the third all firms
participate in the IPJV and we have complete IPJV.
First, under complete VI we have n (symmetric) firms each comprising the U
and the D sections of the vertical production process. Equilibrium magnitudes
are:
q∗iV I =
a
2 + b(n− 1) ,∀i = 1, ..., n
π∗iV I =
(
a
2 + b(n− 1)
)2
− f
p∗iV I = p
∗
V I =
a
2 + b (n− 1) ,
so that aggregate profits are:
ΠV I = n
(
a
2 + b(n− 1)
)2
− nf > 0.
Second, we figure out partial IPJV with (n− k) D firms, competing with k
VI firms, while jointly owning the independent input producer which sets price
g. The D firms’ profits are:
πiD = piqi − gqi, i = 1, ..., n− k
while the VI firms’ profits are:
πjV I = pjqj − f, j = n− k + 1, ..., n
with k ≥ 1 and n > k. Cournot competition leads to the following input price
equilibrium:
g = argmax
g
(
g
n−k∑
i=1
qi − f
)
⇐⇒ gP = a (2− b)
4− 2b (1− k) (5)
Notice that the price set by the partial IPJV, gP , does not depend on the
total number of firms in the industry, n. It depends on the number of firms
adopting VI, i.e., k, as well as on b, the degree of product differentiation in
the D market. In particular, gP is decreasing in k and in b (the tougher the
competition in D, the lower the input price). These two effects may be deemed
vertical externalities since they originate in D while their effect extends to U
price setting.
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Remaining equilibrium magnitudes are:
pjV I =
a (b (k + n− 2) + 4)
2 (b (n− 1) + 2) (b (k − 1) + 2) , j = n− k + 1, ..., n
πjV I =
a2 (b (k + n− 2) + 4)2
4 (b (k − 1) + 2)2 (b (n− 1) + 2)2 − f, j = n− k + 1, ..., n
pi =
a
(
6− b2 (n− 1)− b (5− 2n− k))
2 (b (n− 1) + 2) (b (k − 1) + 2) , i = 1, ..., n− k
πiD =
a2
4 (b (n− 1) + 2)2 , i = 1, ..., n− k
πU =
(2− b) (n− k) a2
4 (b (k − 1) + 2) (b (n− 1) + 2) − f
πpJcons =
a2
(
b (k + 2n− 5) + b2 (1− n) + 6)
4 (b (k − 1) + 2) (b (n− 1) + 2)2 −
f
n− k ,
where pjV I , πjV I and pi, πiD are the prices and profits of the VI firms and of
the D firms, respectively; πpJcons = πiD +
1
n−kπU are the consolidated profit of a
firm participating in the (partial) IPJV. Industry profits are
ΠPJ =
a2(k2b2(n−b+bn+2)−k(3b2−12bn−b3+6b2n−3b2n2+b3n2−4)+n(b−2)2(bn−b+3))
4(bn−b+2)2(bk−b+2)2 −f (k + 1) .
Under complete IPJV, the n D firms set up an Equity Joint Venture for the
joint input production (IPJV). The Equity Joint Venture is thus the unique
input producer setting the monopoly input price gM = a/2. The equilibrium
values are:
q∗iJ =
a
2 (bn− b+ 2)
π∗iD =
a2
4 (bn− b+ 2)2
π∗U =
na2
4 (bn− b+ 2) − f
p∗iJ =
(bn− b+ 3) a
2 (bn− b+ 2) .
Aggregate profits are
ΠJ =
(bn− b+ 3) a2n
4 (bn− b+ 2)2 − f.
Let us compare the different market and vertical arrangements analyzed
above. We classify them according to the degree of downstream market com-
petition measured by b and n, since, as b and n increase, competition in D
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becomes tougher.13 To perform the comparison we split the feasible set of the
differentiation parameter b into distinct areas which depend on n.14 In what
follows we abstract from fixed cost assuming f = 0 and we confine to a partial
IPJV where a single VI firm competes with (n− 1) D firms owning the IPJV,
i.e., k = 1. These two assumptions simplify the analysis without compromising
the results and basic intuitions. Later on, we will discuss extensions to f > 0
and k > 1.
By comparing aggregate profits in the three analyzed vertical arrangements,
we get the following thresholds:
ΠV I −ΠJ = (−b(n−1)+1)a
2n
4(bn−b+2)2 > 0 ⇐⇒ b <
1
n− 1 ≡ b
PJ (n) (6)
ΠV I −ΠPJ = (b
2n−b2−4bn+4)(n−1)a2
16(bn−b+2)2 > 0 ⇐⇒ b <
2(n−
√
n2−n+1)
n−1 ≡ bV I (n)
(7)
ΠJ −ΠPJ = (bn−b−2)a
2
16(bn−b+2) > 0 ⇐⇒ b >
2
(n− 1) ≡ b
J (n) . (8)
From these comparisons we can derive the following:
Proposition 3 Private and social efficiency of complete IPJV, partial IPJV
and VI.
a) For sufficiently high levels of product differentiation, i.e., b ∈ (0, bV I (n)),
the private ranking is: VI ≻ partial IPJV ≻ complete IPJV;
b) For upper intermediate levels of product differentiation, i.e., b ∈ (bV I (n) , bPJ (n)),
the private ranking is: partial IPJV ≻ VI ≻ complete IPJV;
c) For lower intermediate levels of product differentiation, i.e., b ∈ (bPJ (n) , bJ (n)),
the private ranking is: partial IPJV ≻ complete IPJV ≻ VI;
d) For low levels of product differentiation, i.e., b ∈ (bJ (n) , 1], the private
ranking is: complete IPJV ≻ partial IPJV ≻ VI.
e) As for the social welfare (SW ) we have the following ranking: SWV I >
SWPJ > SW .
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we plot (6), (7) and (8) in the plane (n, b) in
Figure 2 below. The upper solid line defines bJ (n) , above which complete IPJV
is the preferred vertical arrangement. Notice that this threshold is meaningful,
i.e., lower than 1, only for n ≥ 4. The intermediate solid line defines bPJ (n) ,
above which partial IPJV is preferred to complete IPJV, which is better than
VI. Between bPJ (n) and the lower solid line which defines bV I (n) , partial IPJV
is preferred to VI which is better than complete IPJV. Finally, between the hor-
izontal axis and the lower solid line, VI is preferred to partial IPJV which is
13As b increases, products become closer substitutes and the market size (the total quantity)
decreases. As for the number of firms, an increase in n, which also defines the number of
varieties, determines an increase of the market size (because of consumers’ love for variety);
however as firms’ profits decrease with n, we take n as another measure of competition.
14As standard in the oligopoly literature, we treat n as a real number. Clearly, we will take
into account the integer problem when it is necessary.
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better than complete IPJV.
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FIGURE 2: Comparisons between aggregate industry surpluses under VI,
partial and completeJIPV
As for social welfare ranking, straightforward calculations lead to:
SWV I =
a2(3 + b(n− 1))n
2(2 + b(n− 1))2
SWPJ =
a2(4(5 + 7n) + b(n− 1)(16− 3b+ 3(4 + b)n))
32(2 + b(n− 1))2
SWJ =
a2(7 + 3b(n− 1))n
8(2 + b(n− 1))2 .
whose ranking, SWV I > SWPJ > SW is independent of the values of n and b.
Discussion.
The above results emphasize the effect of competition measured by b on
private (industry) preferences towards the vertical arrangements. As the degree
of product differentiation decreases firms prefer to switch from VI to some form
of IPJV (partial or complete). This result somewhat replicates and extends the
duopoly outcome seen above.15 However, in the present oligopoly framework
we are able to analyze also the effect of n as well as the interaction between
n and b. As D competition gets fiercer with the number of firms, only high
levels of differentiation are able to preserve the private advantage of VI. On the
15 In line with these findings, the extension to a Bertrand oligopoly which also implies a
more competitive D market structure increases the JIPV profitability. The intuition is the
same as for the duopoly case.
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contrary, under IPJV the D firms are able to “shift” to U the profit cancelled due
to tougher competition. With IPJV in U the D firms are able to compensate the
lost profit in D with the monopoly profit obtained by the single independent U
producer. If the market structure changes and a VI firm enters we have partial
IPJV. As a result, the U market becomes more contestable since the VI firm
makes its own input in-house and drives down the input demand faced by the
incumbent U firm. This translates into a lower g. Therefore, the entry of a VI
firm selling in D provides an automatic policing of the U market. This is an
external effect and it occurs even if the VI company does not sell any input to
the rival D firms, which keep on buying the input from the IPJV.
The limitation of the analysis to zero fixed costs is adopted for a neater
investigation of D market structure effects (b, n) on the ranking of industry
preferences for the three distinct vertical arrangements. If we consider positive
fixed cost the qualitative results obtained in the oligopoly market do not change
as far the effects of b and n are concerned. Nonetheless, a positive f is going to
increase the likelihood of the adoption of IPJV, making this arrangement more
privately (and socially) desirable, since average fixed costs for individual firms
go down with respect to the VI case. This effect has been properly investigated
in Proposition (1). Extensions are straightforward.
Consider now the case of 1 < k < n. If k → n, the partial IPJV tends to
disappear as the market is made entirely by VI firms. Notice that the thresholds
bV I (n) and bJ(n), which define respectively the lower and the upper limit of
the area where partial IPJV is the preferred setting, now depend also on k.
Moreover, ∂bJ/∂k ≤ 0 as it can be easily verified. Further, as k increases, the
aggregate profits of partial IPJV decrease, whereas those of VI do not change,
making for an indirect proof that ∂bV I/∂k > 0. Therefore, in the limit, k →
n, the interval
(
bV I (n) , bJ (n)
)
would not exist anymore. In other words, as
the number of VI firms (k) in the partial IPJV configuration increases, the
probability that partial IPJV is the most preferred setting vanishes.
Last but not the least, in most received literature RJV is deemed superior
because of internalization of spillovers, i.e., externalities. Here, we do not intro-
duce any external effect in the input production. Nonetheless, if external effects
were there they would add to the private benefits of IPJV and have an impact
similar to the saving of fixed costs that the IPJV implies. In all these cases we
may seem areas of social preference emerge beyond and above private efficiency.
4 Disengagement
In Proposition (3) we have analyzed industry preferences towards the three
vertical arrangements. However, one of the main faults of a Joint Venture
is its ability to last and survive despite the presence of incentives to leave it
and go alone or join other ventures. This problem is widely analyzed in the
managerial literature on Joint Ventures (Hewitt, 2008) and is usually framed as
a disengagement question.
The sort of disengagement we are going to consider is caused by the (indi-
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vidual) incentives firms have to move from one status (for instance VI or VS
with IPJV) to another.
To evaluate these incentives we have to compare individual profits in the
different statuses.
The analysis begins with the consideration of two extreme cases and subse-
quently goes to the intermediate.
4.1 Individual incentives
Consider first the two extremes, VI and complete IPJV. As they are symmetric
situations, individual and aggregate preferences coincide. Therefore, we may
write:
π∗iV I − π∗iJ > 0 ⇐⇒ b < bPJ (n) (9)
where bPJ (n) is defined in (6) and decreasing in n. From (9) we see that there
is an incentive for firms involved in IPJV to leave the joint venture and become
VI, provided b is sufficiently low. This event becomes more likely the lower is
the number of firms in the market (as bPJ is decreasing in n). In other words,
the incentive to leave the IPJV plot is higher when the market is made by few
firms and/or the degree of differentiation is high (low b). In these circumstances
the IPJV turns out to be quite fragile and liable to fall apart due to private
incentive to disengage.16
The intermediate situation of partial IPJV has two types of actors, the VI
firm and the D firms owning the independent IPJV. Simple computations show
that the VI firm is worse off than the (n− 1) D firms if fixed costs are high
enough. If we abstract from fixed costs, the VI firm enjoys a variable cost
advantage (input price) with respect to the D firms. Therefore, it holds a
higher market share allowing for higher profits.
If each firm in the IPJV adopts the VI arrangement, the advantage of the
existing VI firm (the nth firm in the market) fades away as the equation below
shows:
π∗nV I − π∗iV I =
(bn− b+ 8) (n− 1) a2b
16 (bn− b+ 2)2 > 0.
The above positive difference defines the loss of profit of the existing VI firm
when remaining firms turn to VI.
As for the D firms, they gain from disengaging only in some areas of param-
eters b and n. To see this we compute the difference representing the incentive
to disengage of the D firms belonging to the IPJV plot. This difference is given
by the following:
π∗iV I − π∗pJicons = a2
b2 (n− 1) + b (4− 2n) + 2
8 (bn− b+ 2)2 > 0
⇐⇒ b < (n−2)−
√
(n2−6n+6)
(n−1) ≡ b1 (n) . (10)
16These conclusions hold for zero fixed costs. Strictly positive fixed costs erode the incentives
to disengage from JIPV.
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From the comparison of individual incentives we obtain the following.
Lemma 4 i) For n = 3, 4 and for sufficiently low levels of substitutability, i.e.,
b < bV I (n), the D firms decide to leave the IPJV plot as they reap larger profits
if they disengage and the VI firm has no incentive to stop them. For higher
levels of product substitutability, i.e., b > bV I (n), the D firms have again the
incentive to leave. However, disengagement may not occur since the existing
unique VI firm can prevent disengagement by compensating the D rival firms.
This is feasible since the loss of the VI would be higher than the gain the D firms
would get if they turn to VI.
ii) For n = 5, 6... and for sufficiently low levels of substitutability, i.e., 0 <
b < bV I (n), the D firms disengage. For bV I (n) < b < b1(n), the VI firm
can stop disengagement since the aggregate profits of partial IPJV are larger
than those of complete VI. Finally for b1 (n) < b < 1 there is no incentive to
disengage.
Proof. We begin stating that
π∗iV I − π∗pJicons > 0 ⇐⇒ b2 (n− 1) + b (4− 2n) + 2 > 0.
This polynomial has two roots: b1 =
(n−2)−
√
(n2−6n+6)
(n−1) , b2 =
(n−2)+
√
(n2−6n+6)
(n−1) .
They are real numbers only for n > 4. Therefore, i) for n = 3, 4 the difference
π∗iV I − π∗pJicons is strictly positive for all feasible b. In other words, each D firm
gains a positive surplus by disengaging from the partial IPJV. This occurs in
both cases, i.e., when each firm leaves the IPJV plot on an individual basis and
when all IPJV firms leave as a group.
ii) For n ≥ 5, the two roots are real. In particular b1 ∈ (0, 1), while b2 ≥ 1,
and is not acceptable. Therefore, π∗iV I − π∗pJicons > 0 ⇐⇒ b < b1.
16
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FIGURE 3: Ranges of b defining the private incentive to disengage
Figure 3 depicts the thesholds defined by (7) and (10) in the plane (n, b).
The solid upper line represents the frontier defined by b1. Above the line there is
no incentive to disengage from IPJV, while below the incentive is nonnegative.
The solid lower line defines the frontier bV I (n) . Below it, disengagement is
profitable and feasible. Above it and below the the frontier, defined by b1, the
VI firm could compensate the IPJV firms if they agree not to move, since the
loss the VI would bear in the case of disengagement would be larger than the
gain IPJV firms obtain.
4.2 Sorting the equilibria
From the above considerations and taking into account Lemma 4, we may derive
the following.
Proposition 5 Sorting Nash equilibria (NE)
For low levels of product market substitutability, i.e., b < bV I (n), the adop-
tion of VI by all firms is a NE. For high levels of product market substitutability,
i.e., b > bJ (n), the adoption of IPJV by all firms is a NE. For intermediate
levels of product substitutability partial IPJV turns out to be a NE if a mecha-
nism is set up whereby the VI firm(s) compensates the D firms in order to stop
them from disengaging and leaving the IPJV.
Proof. Looking at the aggregate industry profits, we see that for b < bV I (n),
(lower solid line in Figure 3), VI is strictly better than partial IPJV, so that
the adoption of VI by all firms is a NE (there would not be any possibility for
the single VI firm of the partial IPJV configuration to compensate the others
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not to disengage). Also for n ≥ 5 and b < b1 the D firms gain from the switch:
however only for bV I (n) < b < b1 there is the compensation incentive (the
difference between the profit of the VI firm in the presence of disengagement
and the VI profit without disengagement is larger than the difference between
the profits of Ds with disengagement and those without disengagement). For
n ≥ 5 and bJ > b > b1 the D firms participating to the partial IPJV do not
have any incentive to disengage as π∗iV I < π
∗pJ
icons: in this area the partial IPJV
is a NE. Finally, for b > bJ (n) > b1, aggregate profits are higher with complete
IPJV, so that the D firms have the incentive and the possibility to persuade
the single VI firm to join the venture. The single VI firm would not have the
incentive to switch, unless compensated by D firms, since:
πnV I − πJi =
1
16
a2 > 0,
where πJi is the compensated profit of a firm in the complete IPJV,
πJi =
a2
4 (bn− b+ 2)2 +
1
n
na2
4 (bn− b+ 2)
and for k = 1
πnV I =
(bn− b+ 4)2 a2
16 (bn− b+ 2)2 .
These prove the existence of the Nash equilibria mentioned in Proposition 5.
Discussion. The wealth of Nash Equilibria proves the private efficiency
of IPJV in many circumstances and its ability to survive. However, the fact
that there are many areas of incentives to disengage and also some mechanism
that may sustain them points to the frequent divorces observed in many joint
ventures of all kinds, IPJV included.
5 Profit volatility of VI and IPJV
A further question we address concerns the relative preference of the different
vertical arrangements under uncertainty. Actually, an important rationale be-
hind many forms of joint ventures is risk sharing. We thus investigate the effect
of uncertain market demands for the final goods on IPJV desirability. The
answer may come from a simple extension to a triopoly framework with one
VI firm competing with the other two D firms which jointly own, on an equal
stake, an independent input producer (partial IPJV). We enrich the model by
the considerations of both Cournot and Bertand competition.
Consider the following inverse demand functions:
p1 = a− q1 − b(q2 + q3) + e
p2 = a− q2 − b(q1 + q3) + e (11)
p3 = a− q3 − b(q1 + q2) + e
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where e is the additive shock parameter with E (e) = 0, and E
(
e2
)
= σ2.
We begin with Cournot competition. In this framework the D firms maximize
expected profits selecting a quantity to which they will stick regardless of the
realization of the stochastic shock. This quantity is anticipated by U, which
chooses the profit maximizing input price g. This price is deterministic. Given
the optimal g, D firms get realized profits and prices which depend on the
stochastic shock. As usual, the VI firm just maximizes expected profit of the
entire vertical chain of production. The set of equilibrium realized profits is:
π1D = π2D =
a(a+ 4(1 + b)e)
16(1 + b)2
πU =
a2 (2− b)
8 (1 + b)
πcons =
a(a+ 4(1 + b)e)
16(1 + b)2
+
a2 (2− b)
16 (1 + b)
πV I =
a(b+2)(2a+ab+4e(1+b))
16(1+b)2
As it can be seen, only πU is certain, while π1D, π2D, πV I are affected by
uncertainty. If we take expectations we see that all expected profits are equal
to certainty profits of the corresponding triopoly case. Therefore, the private
rankings do not change with respect to what seen above in the certainty case.
However, volatility is not irrelevant. If we compare the variance of πV I with
that of πcons, we discover that the former is more volatile than the latter:
var (πV I) =
a2(2 + b)2
16 (1 + b)2
σ2 > var (πcons) =
a2
16 (1 + b)2
σ2.
This means that the profit volatility of the IPJV is lower than that of VI. This
result is due to the fact that the U joint venture is not affected by uncertainty
and therefore its profit provides a sort of cushion against risk also for D firms.
On the contrary the VI firm does not enjoy this chunk of sure profit and therefore
shows higher volatility. IPJV does not generate an actual risk sharing along the
vertical chain, since the entire risk is faced by D firms while the U joint venture
is somehow isolated from risk.
A different story can be told when firms compete à la Bertrand, while facing
the same kind of demand uncertainty. In that case the equilibrium profits are:
π1D = π2D =
a(1−b)(a+ab+4e)
16(2b+1)
πU =
a(1−b)(2+3b)(a+ab+4e)
8(1+b(3+b−2b2)
πcons =
a(1−b)(3−(−4+b)b)(a+ab+4e)
8(1+b(3+b−2b2)
πV I =
a(1−b)(2−b2+3b)(a(b+1)(2−b2+3b)+4e(1−b2+b))
16(b2−b−1)2(2b+1)
As far as the different level of volatility of the two arrangements are con-
cerned, we can write the following variances:
var (πV I) =
a2(−1+b)2(−2+(−3+b)b)2
16(1+b(3+b−2b2)2 σ
2 < var (πcons) =
a2(−1+b)2(−3+(−4+b)b)2
16(1+b(3+b−2b2)2 σ
2,
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from which it appears that the ranking of volatility under Bertrand competition
is reversed. In addition to that, the sharing of risk along the vertical chain in
the IPJV is now more balanced since both U and D profits are affected by σ2
and, therefore, they both contribute to the entire volatility of IPJV.
Taking into account all these considerations, we may write the following
result.
Proposition 6 Effect of demand uncertainty on IPJV
Additive demand uncertainty does not change the ranking of private and so-
cial preference of IPJV in both Cournot and Bertrand competition with respect
to certainty. However, it does affect the relative volatility of the two vertical
arrangements and risk sharing along the vertical chain: under Cournot com-
petition IPJV is less volatile than VI and the entire market risk is born by D
firms, while under Bertrand competition the IPJV is more volatile and there is
risk sharing between U and D firms.
Discussion. The above result underlies the importance of IPJV for risk
sharing along the vertical chain of production, regardless of the nature of com-
petition assumed in D. The fact that IPJV changes the distribution of risk
between U and D according to whether Bertrand or Cournot is adopted may
make one of the two market strategies preferred because of the risk allocation
that it produces.
6 Conclusions
In these pages we have analyzed the social and private desirability of Input
Production Joint Ventures (IPJV), which can be seen as an intermediate or-
ganizational setting lying between the two extremes of vertical integration and
vertical separation. As pointed out in the management literature, this form of
joint venture is widely adopted in many industries. Nonetheless, the theoretical
IO literature on this topic is surprisingly thin. Generally, production joint ven-
tures do not arise competitive concerns from antitrust authorities on the basis of
economies of scale and synergies. IPJV is definitely a form of partial collusion.
When compared to vertical integration, in some cases, IPJV turns out to be
privately desirable but inefficient from a social welfare point of view, even if it
allows for savings in fixed cost.
Our results are twofold. We provide a first theoretical model for the analysis
and show that IPJV may be privately preferred to vertical integration even in the
absence of wasteful duplication of fixed costs: firms’ incentives to form a IPJV
increase with the degree of downstream market competition. We characterize
the conditions under which IPJV is privately optimal and argue that firms’
incentives may be welfare detrimental. Finally, we provide a rationale for the
empirical relevance of IPJV both in terms of its ability to survive and in terms
of disengagement incentives. To this purpose we investigate market structures
where firms doing IPJV compete with vertically integrated rivals. We find that,
if product market substitutability is low, there may be an incentive for firms
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doing IPJV to leave and turn to vertical integration. However, this incentive
could be efficiently neutralized via a transfer mechanism whereby incumbent
vertically integrated firms compensate IPJV members to stay in. Our emphasis
on disengagement is due to the high rate of divorces among firms joining IPJV
(Hewitt, 2008).
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